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Research Ethics Boards: Size, Not 
Money
Joal Hill
I read with interest the debate about for-proﬁ  t versus 
non-proﬁ  t institutional review boards (IRBs) [1], but was 
disappointed that no one addressed the ability (or inability) 
of for-proﬁ  t IRBs to review studies with the local context of 
research subjects in mind and then monitor what actually 
occurs during the consent process throughout the research 
trial. 
To my mind the “bigness” of for-proﬁ  t IRBs may be more 
of an impediment in protecting research subjects than their 
inherent conﬂ  ict of interest. Our IRB has reviewed consent 
forms approved by central/for-proﬁ  t IRBs that contained 
obvious errors such as schemas that did not match protocol 
narrative and use of eight point font in a study of geriatric 
subjects. Even when the initial review is outstanding, it 
seems a practical impossibility for a single IRB to provide 
meaningful monitoring of the actual consent process and 
implementation of the protocol at sites throughout the 
country. The greater “efﬁ  ciency” of for-proﬁ  t IRBs is only 
a meaningful beneﬁ  t if increased speed can be shown 
not to occur at the expense of careful review of consent 
forms, real understanding of the local research context, 
and a commitment to audit the informed consent process 
throughout the study for the protection of research subjects, 
including ongoing education and advice for researchers and 
their teams. 
This is not to say that all local IRBs perform this function 
as they should, but it does seem almost impossible for one 
IRB to perform local review and oversight for research sites 
around the nation in a way that really makes a difference for 
the men, women, and children who give of their time and 
their bodies so that society can beneﬁ  t.  
Joal Hill (joal.hill@advocatehealth.com)
Advocate Health Care
Park Ridge, Illinois, United States of America
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Research Ethics Boards: Error and 
Misconception
Angela Bowen
We are compelled to respond to the concerns expressed by 
Lemmens and Elliott [1] about the Western Institutional 
Review Board (WIRB) and address the errors and 
misconceptions contained therein. We have worked diligently 
to protect the IRB decision-making process from the “for-
proﬁ  t” conﬂ  ict and many believe that WIRB has set the 
standard for separation of board and business in the IRB 
community.
More than 200 people visit WIRB each year to observe our 
processes, systems, and board meetings. These visitors ﬁ  nd 
that:
•  The ethics review process is totally separate from the 
business of WIRB.
•  The regulations are carefully and completely respected on 
a daily basis.
•  Freedom of decision-making is expected by and of each 
board member.
•  Board members and alternates are fully trained and 
regularly updated.
•  Appropriate expertise is available.
•  Meetings are convened.
•  Disapprovals are as respected as approvals.
•  There is never pressure to change a decision.
•  WIRB’s work comes from the 148 academic and other 
institutions where WIRB is listed on the Federalwide 
Assurance form and includes both federally funded and 
privately funded research from non-institutionally based 
investigators; about one-third comes from the 400+ 
public companies, contract research organizations, and 
foundations that fund medical research.
The following inaccuracies reﬂ  ect the credibility of the 
referenced Bloomberg Market article: 
•  WIRB’s annual revenues were not accurately stated.
•  The number of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
submission reviews attributed to WIRB was not accurate.
•  The Georgia investigators, whom WIRB last reviewed in 
1994, were not jailed for endangering research subjects 
but for diverting funds from the state of Georgia.
•  WIRB was not the primary target of the lawsuit cited, 
which was settled by the insurer as a nuisance settlement 
on behalf of the group.
•  FDA’s audits are not done haphazardly; they occur every 
three years or as indicated.
Auditors, the FDA, the Ofﬁ  ce for Human Research 
Protections, and accreditors see our work around the world. 
Any ﬂ  aws surely would be noticed and corrected. WIRB 
will continue to rely on our longstanding reputation for 
transparency and reliability in the research community.  
Angela Bowen (abowen@wirb.com)
Western Institutional Review Board
Olympia, Washington, United States of America
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Research Ethics Boards: The Protection 
of Human Subjects
Valia S. Lestou, Nancy Ondrusek, Morris A. Blajchman
Compelling arguments, documentation, and published 
data have always been the basis of scholarly examination, 
discussion, and reasoning. Rhetorical catch phrases, 
biased ideologies, and anecdotal reports, when used to 
prove erroneous and often unrelated points, are creating 
condemnation and polarization instead of awareness on the 
important issues of research ethics boards.
The statement that “they are in a client–provider business 
relationship” as expressed in the article by Lemmens and 
Elliott [1] implies a direct ﬁ  nancial relationship between 
sponsors and those reviewing their research protocols. This 
is incorrect. Since we cannot speak on behalf of other for-
proﬁ  t Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), we will describe 
how our Canadian for-proﬁ  t IRB functions. The owners 
of the company and those involved in the running of the 
business are not IRB members and have no voting privileges. 
IRB members are external consultants who are paid by the 
company providing the review services for the time spent 
in reviewing a protocol and providing an expert ruling 
regarding the ethics and science of a particular study. IRB 
members have no business interests in the company (e.g., 
partnership or proﬁ  t-sharing) and no vested interest in 
the approval or non-approval of a speciﬁ  c study. It is worth 
noting that members of academic or governmental not-for-
proﬁ  t IRBs are often paid for the ethical review services they 
provide, in recognition of the time and skill required to carry 
out their duties.
Respected, well-organized, and accredited IRBs (for-
proﬁ  t and not-for-proﬁ  t) are not an enterprise of “ﬁ  ve 
people”. This is merely the minimal regulatory requirement, 
which we consistently exceed in our meetings. IRBs are 
complex bodies of highly qualiﬁ  ed professional experts 
from various disciplines, such as physicians, pharmacists, 
scientists, lawyers, philosophers, ethicists, and lay persons. 
They are multicultural, balanced in gender, diverse in social 
background, and dedicated to the protection of research 
subjects (which remains the main mandate for all IRBs). 
Often, for-proﬁ  t IRB members are serving or have served as 
IRB members on academic or governmental not-for-proﬁ  t 
IRBs. Is it expected that the work of these individuals is 
ethical when they are volunteers, and unethical when they are 
remunerated for their expertise?
Rather than ﬁ  xate on the concept that members of IRBs 
are paid, we should concentrate on the real challenges 
regarding IRBs (for-proﬁ  t and not-for-proﬁ  t) and try to 
propose some meaningful insight. Ethics in biomedical 
research is a serious and complex affair with huge societal 
implications. Expert advisors that are paid or not paid are 
not the problem that IRBs face today. It is rather the rapidly 
growing complexity of biomedical research that confronts 
IRBs, together with the lack of a timely transfer of knowledge, 
often due to insufﬁ  cient resources, the lack of continuing 
education, and the lack of sufﬁ  cient and appropriate member 
expertise. IRBs are expected to function as multifaceted 
oversight bodies and assume many duties, including ethics 
consultation, education, peer reviewing, adverse events 
reporting, publication policies, and the review of ﬁ  nancial 
conﬂ  icts of interest. 
The attention should be focused on whether IRBs are 
performing to the highest ethical standards and conforming 
to existing regulations rather than if their members are 
remunerated or not. Singling out the issue of payment 
distracts from sincere discussion on how to improve and 
ensure high-quality reviews of biomedical research and 
maintain the protection of the human subjects involved.  
Valia S. Lestou (valia_lestou@elitemail.org)
Nancy Ondrusek
Morris A. Blajchman
Institutional Review Board Services
Aurora, Ontario, Canada
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Research Ethics Boards: No Data on 
Quality of For-Proﬁ  t or Non-Proﬁ  t IRBs
Adil E. Shamoo, Elizabeth Woeckner
We are concerned by two inaccurate statements offered 
by Emanuel [1]. First, he claims: “And in recent years, the 
OHRP [Ofﬁ  ce for Human Research Protections] has called 
upon WIRB [Western Institutional Review Board] to re-review 
protocols and revamp the IRB processes and procedures 
at not-for-proﬁ  t academic institutions where the OHRP 
had temporarily suspended research.” We were sufﬁ  ciently 
surprised by this that we sought clariﬁ  cation from OHRP 
Director Bernard Schwetz, who was kind enough to explain 
that Emanuel’s statement was incorrect, and further, that 
“The Ofﬁ  ce for Human Research Protections has never asked 
WIRB to re-review protocols for any institution, nor would 
OHRP endorse any IRB in such a manner. OHRP will provide 
information about the several such IRBs. However OHRP 
does not suggest that we endorse any of these commercial 
or independent IRB services” [B Schwetz, personal 
communication].
Accordingly it is incorrect to conclude, as Emanuel does, 
that “Calling upon WIRB constitutes a vote of conﬁ  dence 
by federal regulators that at least this one for-proﬁ  t entity 
provides high-quality IRB review.”
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Second, Emanuel writes: “OHRP has never suspended 
a for-proﬁ  t IRB.” This is misleading and incorrect in that 
OHRP regulates institutions, not IRBs. OHRP Director 
Bernard Schwetz was kind enough to clarify that “While 
this statement is true, it is also true that OHRP has never 
suspended a not-for-proﬁ  t IRB.”
It is useful to reﬂ  ect upon the fact that WIRB has been the 
IRB of record in a number of egregious cases. For example: 
Faruk S. Abuzzahab, MD (medical license suspended 
following the death of research subject inter alia); Robert 
A. Fiddes, MD (indicted and convicted for research fraud); 
and Richard L. Borison, MD and Bruce I. Diamond, PhD 
(indicted and convicted for research fraud) [2]. Moreover 
WIRB was copied on the OHRP determination letters 
to Oregon Health and Science University regarding the 
Student Athlete Drug Surveillance Trial trial, the reasonable 
conclusion from which is that WIRB was involved in its review 
and approval [3,4].
There is no data, scientiﬁ  c or otherwise, because the lack 
of universal, legally codiﬁ  ed human research protections 
discourages, if not prevents, collection of such information. 
We agree that commercial IRBs are not unacceptable 
simply because they review proposed research for a fee, but 
commercial IRBs may provide unacceptable review and 
oversight when they exist primarily to provide rapid approvals.
Finally, we would like to offer bibliographical addenda. 
Emanuel writes: “With Wood and Grady, I have proposed a 
system of regional ethics organizations that would review and 
monitor research protocols.” A recent paper reviewed the 
history of the proposals for regional IRBs [5]. The earliest 
suggestion for regional ethics organizations identiﬁ  ed was 
Alberti (1995) [6].  
Adil E. Shamoo (ashamoo@umaryland.edu)
University of Maryland School of Medicine
Baltimore, Maryland, United States of America
Elizabeth Woeckner
Citizens for Responsible Care and Research
Columbia, Maryland, United States of America
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Research Ethics Boards: Reply from Ezekiel Emanuel
I have misstated. Obviously, as a governmental agency, the 
Ofﬁ  ce for Human Research Protections (OHRP) could not 
“endorse” the Western Institutional Review Board (WIRB) to 
re-review protocols at institutions whose federal assurance was 
suspended, or advise such institutions to consult WIRB. As Dr. 
Schwetz reminded me [1], OHRP could provide information 
about independent or other IRBs that could help suspended 
institutions re-review protocols, but could not suggest which 
one they should employ or endorse a particular IRB. I 
presume OHRP would not provide information to institutions 
on IRBs that it deemed to have questionable practices or 
performance in reviewing protocols. So while as a government 
agency it could not provide a formal endorsement, there is 
an implied claim that the IRBs mentioned by OHRP conduct 
satisfactory reviews. Furthermore, as a matter of fact it is 
worthy of note that the University of Rochester, the University 
of Colorado, Johns Hopkins University, and other academic 
institutions whose federal assurance was suspended by OHRP 
ended up consulting WIRB. I stand corrected.  
Ezekiel J. Emanuel (eemanuel@mail.cc.nih.gov)
National Institutes of Health
Bethesda, Maryland, United States of America
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Research Ethics Boards: Reply from Trudo Lemmens 
and Carl Elliott
Our basic argument is this: for-proﬁ  t research ethics boards 
are in a client–provider relationship with study sponsors; 
this relationship creates a conﬂ  ict of interest; and this 
conﬂ  ict of interest is particularly dangerous under a weak 
regulatory system which does not prevent forum shopping 
and allows market criteria to inﬂ  uence committee selection. 
We use various examples of serious controversies to support 
our claim that there are ﬂ  aws in the system. This seems 
more appropriate than using one or two “good examples” 
to argue that the system works just ﬁ  ne. The claim by 
two for-proﬁ  t research ethics boards that they manage to 
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perform admirably despite this conﬂ  ict of interest would not 
undermine our argument, even if independent evidence 
were given for the claim. (None is given here, of course.) 
Academic committees are certainly also affected by conﬂ  icts 
of interest. But that doesn’t remove the conﬂ  ict in for-proﬁ  t 
review. The widely lauded system of accreditation is in our 
opinion a soft self-regulatory mechanism which does not ﬁ  ll 
the regulatory loopholes.
Lestou, Ondrusek, and Blajchman [1] are members 
of IRB Services, the for-proﬁ  t research ethics committee 
that approved the controversial immunosuppressant study 
conducted at an Anapharm research unit in Montreal. As we 
noted in our article, which referred to a Bloomberg report 
[2], a number of subjects in that trial were infected with 
tuberculosis. Commentators (Steven Miles, and one of us—
Lemmens) interviewed by Bloomberg criticized IRB Services 
for some aspects of its review, including for not imposing 
basic tuberculosis screening of participants and for approving 
a backloaded payment structure intended to keep people in 
the trial [2]. It is worth noting that Anapharm used at least 
one other prominent Canadian for-proﬁ  t committee in the 
past [3], raising concerns about forum shopping.
We referred to WIRB in our article because WIRB is 
frequently lauded as setting the highest research ethics 
standards. Thus it seems particularly relevant that even WIRB 
has had its share of problems. Our reference to the sheer 
number of reviews conducted by WIRB reﬂ  ects our concern 
about the power of one commercial entity in the exercise 
of what we consider a fundamental public function. WIRB 
has become a state within the state when it comes to the 
protection of human subjects. Particularly in the absence 
of strict regulatory control, it is worth asking whether it is 
healthy to concentrate so much power over the protection of 
human subjects in the hands of one commercial enterprise. 
Shamoo and Woeckner [4] rightly point to the difﬁ  culty of 
gaining empirical evidence on research ethics boards. One of 
us conducted a survey of for-proﬁ  t research ethics boards in 
1997 [5]. While several committees collaborated well with this 
survey (including WIRB and IRB Services), much information 
remained hidden behind a veil of corporate secrecy. 
Regulatory agencies in Canada and the United States simply 
accept this secrecy. Some regulators even rely on the goodwill 
of research ethics boards to determine regulatory initiatives. 
When the US Food and Drug Administration looked into the 
issue of “IRB shopping,” for example, it invited comments, 
received them primarily from those in the industry, and 
simply accepted the claim that shopping for research ethics 
boards was not a serious concern [6]. 
The idea of regional committees is indeed not new, as 
Shamoo and Woeckner indicate. They cite as ﬁ  rst source 
an article of 1995. However, research ethics committees 
with exclusive territorial jurisdiction have existed in several 
European countries since the late 1980s to early 1990s (e.g., 
France, Switzerland, and Denmark). They have since been 
introduced in many more countries. Emanuel suggests that 
we have failed to make positive contributions to the debate on 
the organization of research ethics boards and contrasts that 
with his 2004 proposal for regional review boards. In fact, one 
of us (Lemmens) has argued since 1996 for improvements to 
the regulatory structure of research ethics boards, including 
the introduction of regional committees, in scholarly journals 
[5,7–11], at international conferences, and in a report for 
the Council of Europe [9]. Excerpts of one of these articles 
[7] were reprinted in a text book on research ethics edited 
by Emanuel and others [12]. We are pleased to know that 
Emanuel has come to agree.  
Trudo Lemmens (trudo.lemmens@utoronto.ca)
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts
Brussels, Belgium
Carl Elliott
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States of America
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Industry-Sponsored Research: A More 
Comprehensive Alternative
Peter Mansﬁ  eld
Julio Sotelo’s proposal for pharmaceutical research to be 
organised by a Collegiate Research Council (CRC) funded by 
October 2006  |  Volume 3  |  Issue 10  |  e471  |  e463PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1972
drug companies [1] is one of several alternatives that deserve 
debate [2].
The Sotelo proposal has advantages, but if the CRC 
is a single international monopoly how could the risk of 
corruption and inefﬁ  ciency be managed? Alternatively, if 
there were competing CRCs, they would be under pressure to 
compromise to win more contracts, as happens already with 
contract research organisations. 
Fiona Godlee has proposed that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers be banned from researching their products 
[3]. She suggests that “to get their products licensed 
[drug companies] would contribute to a central pot for 
independent, publicly funded clinical trials.” She did not 
specify what percentage of the “central pot” would be funded 
by taxpayers versus pharmaceutical companies. If the funding 
was mostly from pharmaceutical companies then her proposal 
is similar to Sotelo’s. If not, how will governments to be 
persuaded to allocate adequate funds?
My organisation, Healthy Skepticism Inc., advocates a 
more comprehensive alternative that will also reduce the 
harms currently caused by misleading promotion, biased 
industry funding of education, and high drug prices. Our 
alternative is politically achievable because implementation 
can be achieved without increasing costs for pharmaceuticals 
currently paid by individuals and/or third party payers 
(governments or insurance companies) whilst securing 
long-term competitive return on investment for the 
pharmaceutical industry.
Pharmaceutical companies currently have four main 
functions: manufacturing, research, promotion, and 
education. Performance of those functions is currently 
distorted by incentive systems that reward only activities 
that increase sales of more expensive drugs regardless of 
the impact on health care. We recommend that these four 
functions be paid for separately by government agencies via 
iterative open competitive public tender. This would allow 
the relevant divisions and subcontractors of pharmaceutical 
companies to compete with universities and other non-
proﬁ  t organisations for funding to provide each function 
separately. Incentives can then to be aligned to reward quality 
performance at each function separately. If a company 
performed poorly, e.g., committed research fraud or provided 
misleading promotion, then it would not get funding for 
that function in the next tender round. Drug prices would 
no longer include a premium for research, promotion, and 
education. Consequently, drug companies would no longer 
fund those functions from drug sales. Lower prices would 
make drugs more cost-effective for larger numbers of people. 
Our recommendations can be implemented quickly or 
slowly by gradually reducing prices and transferring the 
savings to organisations that fund research (e.g., the United 
Kingdom Medical Research Council); education (e.g., 
medical schools and specialist colleges); and promotion 
(e.g., Best Practice Advocacy Centre, New Zealand). We 
also recommend improving regulation of pharmaceutical 
companies and improving education, incentive systems, and 
regulation for health professionals[4–7].  
Peter Mansﬁ  eld (peter@healthyskepticism.org)
Healthy Skepticism Inc.
Willunga, South Australia, Australia
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Industry-Sponsored Research: Author’s Reply
In his letter [1] Dr. Mansﬁ  eld has raised a debatable issue: 
“If the CRC [Collegiate Research Council] is a single 
international monopoly how could the risk of corruption and 
inefﬁ  ciency be managed?” By no means would the CRC be an 
international monopoly; in the proposal it was stated that the 
CRC would be certiﬁ  ed by the appropriate health authorities 
of any country. Moreover, several CRCs could be established, 
as long as the participants were nominated by prestigious 
academic institutions and the CRC was certiﬁ  ed by the federal 
regulatory agencies. 
The risk of corruption and inefﬁ  ciency would be remote 
for the following reasons. The constituents of the CRC 
would be distinguished scholars, appointed independently 
by leading medical institutions and universities. Contrary to 
Dr. Mansﬁ  eld’s and Dr. Prabhakar’s fears [1,2], this council 
would not require a substantial infrastructure, since its main 
goal would be to meet periodically, to select the investigators 
and institutions that would conduct the clinical protocol 
submitted during that period, and to review the results 
generated by previous trials. This task could be expedited 
through the peer review method. The administrative 
implementation necessary to carry out the decisions of the 
CRC might be done by existing institutions (e.g., the US 
Food and Drug Administration), without the formation of an 
additional bureaucratic body. In this way, the CRC would be 
strictly maintained as an academic and scientiﬁ  c core whose 
opinions and sanctions were respected by the individuals and 
institutions involved in the execution of any given protocol of 
drug testing.
The CRC would not have “bureaucratic bodies,” as it would 
function only as a collegiate board to select who would do the 
testing and where a given protocol of drug testing would be 
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conducted. The research funds provided by the pharmaceutical 
company would not be administered by the CRC, but by the 
corresponding institution in charge of the speciﬁ  c research or 
by the administrators appointed by the CRC. 
To the question of who would fund the CRC the answer is 
simple: a very small percentage of the total cost of the protocol 
would be used to create a fund to cover travel expenses and 
stipends for the scholars participating in the CRC. 
In response to the statement that the CRC “will consume 
signiﬁ  cant amounts of time and human resources” [2], I 
do not see why this should be the case. I believe that the 
members of the CRC could meet once or twice a month and 
propose, in a single day, one or various candidates for a given 
protocol. The operation of the CRC would be somewhat 
similar to that of the editorial board of scientiﬁ  c journals who 
meet periodically to select reviewers for scientiﬁ  c papers and 
to evaluate the results of reviews. Once the scholars of the 
CRC had selected the potential investigators or institutions 
they would be invited to conduct the research; this task could 
be accomplished by commissioned personnel independent 
from the regulatory agency. 
With regard to the prices of drugs, I think that Dr. 
Prabhakar has not chosen a comparable example. In fact, 
hospital charges and physicians’ consultations are not 
controlled in most countries; that is because these prices 
are usually set—very much as for many other services and 
goods—by production costs and competition. As mentioned 
in my proposal, this is not the case for pharmaceutical 
substances.  
Julio Sotelo (jsotelo@servidor.unam.mx)
National Institute of Neurology and Neurosurgery of Mexico
Mexico City, Mexico
References
1. Mansﬁ  eld P (2006) Industry-sponsored research: A more comprehensive 
alternative. PLoS Med 3: e463. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030463
2.  Prabhakar V (2006) Ordering the food for thought [e-letter] PLoS Med 3. 
Available: http:⁄⁄medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/
?request=read-response&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0030306#r1240. 
Accessed 29 September 2006.
Citation: Sotelo J (2006) Industry-sponsored research: Author’s reply. PLoS Med 
3(10): e464. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030464
Copyright: © 2006 Julio Sotelo. This is an open-access article distributed under the 
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted 
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author 
and source are credited.
Funding: The author received no speciﬁ  c funding for this article. 
Competing Interests: The author has declared that no competing interests exist.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030464
Proﬁ  ling of CSF: Reliability of 
Diagnosis
Robert Matthews
Research that points towards more reliable diagnosis of 
schizophrenia is always to be welcomed. However, the impact 
of the relatively low prevalence of this disorder on the 
reliability of any test should be borne in mind when assessing 
any proposed diagnostic.
Holmes et al. [1] ﬁ  nd a sensitivity for their cerebrospinal 
ﬂ  uid (CSF) test of 82% and a speciﬁ  city of 85%. Thus 
their test increases the weight of evidence in favour of a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia by a factor of 0.82/(1 − 0.85) = 
5.5. While impressive, this ﬁ  gure must be balanced against 
the population prevalence of schizophrenia of around 1%. A 
simple calculation then shows that the CSF test increases the 
probability for the presence of schizophrenia to around 5%. 
Or, put somewhat more bleakly, in the absence of any other 
diagnostic evidence, it is still 95% probable that a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia is not merited. 
While the work of Holmes et al. may well be a step towards 
reliable diagnosis, it is perhaps a much smaller step than one 
might expect.  
Robert Matthews (r.matthews@physics.org)
Aston University
Birmingham, United Kingdom
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Proﬁ  ling of CSF: Small Subgroups
Dave Hambridge
This very encouraging article [1] is based on relatively small 
subgroups of patients. That in itself does not invalidate the 
conclusions, providing that the subjects in each group have 
the same illness.
I recently reported that many detained psychiatric inpatients 
had not been fully investigated to exclude organic causes of 
their seeming ﬁ  rst episode of schizophrenic-like psychosis [2].
These authors state that their patients had DSM-IV–
diagnosed schizophrenia, which excludes organic causation. 
What investigations did they do to ensure that their clinical 
sample had no organic precipitants?  
Dave Hambridge (hambidge207@btinternet.com)
Staffordshire, United Kingdom
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Proﬁ  ling of CSF: Authors’ Reply
We are grateful to Dr. Matthews for his comments [1]. With 
a sensitivity of 82% and a speciﬁ  city of 85%, the metabolic 
markers for schizophrenia identiﬁ  ed in our study are certainly 
not perfect. However, we have already identiﬁ  ed further 
biomarkers and envisage that a panel of biomarkers can be 
used for diagnostic purposes. The utility of these biomarkers 
will be established in our future clinical studies.
We take the point of Dr. Hambridge [2], and agree that 
patients who present with schizophrenia-like symptoms need 
to be fully investigated with respect to possible (treatable) 
underlying pathologies. However, we strongly disagree 
with the concept of schizophrenia not being an “organic 
disorder”. Unfortunately, as Dr. Hambridge points out, this 
atavistic view is still portrayed in the current classiﬁ  cation 
systems, but we hope that by now most psychiatrists would 
agree that schizophrenia has a biological/organic aetiology. 
The concept of schizophrenia as a “functional psychosis” is a 
misnomer, as every function has a biological/organic basis. 
As stated in our article, all patients included in our 
study underwent a thorough neurological and psychiatric 
examination. The majority of patients had cMRI scans 
or cCT scans (when MRI was not available at the time of 
admission), and a battery of blood tests including syphilis 
and endocrinological screening. Serum and CSF testing 
for neurotropic viruses and borreliosis as well as routine 
parameters were undertaken in accordance with European 
guidelines for cerebrospinal ﬂ  uid (CSF) diagnostics. 
Furthermore, patients had urine drug screens, an 
electroencephalogram, and were examined using a 
neuropsychological test-battery as well as having an 
optional HIV test as ﬁ  rst-line investigation. For our study 
as well as for our daily clinical routine, the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia or schizophreniform disorder (with regard to 
time criteria only) is only given if no ﬁ  ndings indicative of 
other neuropsychiatric/neurological disorders, other than 
schizophrenia, were obtained. We would like to emphasise 
that it is not our opinion that the possible use of biomarker 
proﬁ  les, such as those identiﬁ  ed in our study, would eliminate 
the need for extensive neurological/biochemical screening 
of any patient with psychosis. Instead, our study strongly 
justiﬁ  es the need to perform an extensive battery of clinical 
tests. Unfortunately, this is not clinical practice in many 
countries, not least for reasons of cost and the low proﬁ  le that 
psychiatric patients have within our health systems.  
Sabine Bahn (sb209@cam.ac.uk)
University of Cambridge
Cambridge, United Kingdom
F. Markus Leweke
University of Cologne
Cologne, Germany
Jeffrey T.-J. Huang 
University of Cambridge
Cambridge, United Kingdom
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Preterm Birth: Effect of Corticosteroids 
or Immediate Cord Clamping?
David Hutchon, Ben Ononeze
The authors report that conventional antenatal corticosteroid 
therapy was received by all mothers [1]. While antenatal 
steroids reduce morbidity from respiratory distress syndrome 
and probably reduce neonatal mortality [2], there is also 
evidence that the steroid has an effect on brain development 
[3]. Multiple courses of steroids have been shown to 
reduce head size [4]. Multiple doses of steroids are not 
now recommended but may have been used before 2000. 
How many of these mothers received multiple courses? 
Furthermore, if multiple courses have a demonstrable effect, 
it is quite feasible that there is a minor effect on the brain by 
a single course.
The ﬁ  ndings of this paper are consistent with capillary 
vascular damage occurring at delivery. 73% of these babies 
were delivered by caesarean section. We are not suggesting 
that the caesarean delivery in itself would have an adverse 
effect, but almost certainly all these babies would have had 
the cord clamped immediately at delivery. Clamping the 
cord immediately at birth, especially before the ﬁ  rst breath is 
taken, interferes with the transformation from fetal to adult 
circulation. It is justiﬁ  ed by the need to resuscitate the baby 
and maintain its temperature. The intervention of immediate 
cord clamping needs to be justiﬁ  ed by evidence, which has 
never been sought. Indeed there is considerable evidence 
emerging that it is harmful to term [5], preterm [6], and 
very preterm infants [7]. Immediate umbilical cord clamping 
is the result of tradition and is carried out without thought 
by the vast majority of obstetricians and paediatricians. In 
the 1980s Peter Dunn, working in Bristol, demonstrated a 
technique of delivery at caesarean section for the preterm 
baby which avoided the hazards of immediate cord clamping 
[8]. This was before the use of antenatal corticosteroids or 
surfactant, yet the survival rates were excellent. 
We would like to alert the clinical community to two issues. 
Firstly, antenatal corticosteroids are currently given much 
too readily, often when there is very little risk of preterm 
birth. Secondly, the cord must not be clamped immediately 
at delivery, especially for caesarean sections, and ways to 
allow resuscitation of the neonate with the cord intact must 
be routine clinical practice. Further research is needed to 
determine how much of the brain damage demonstrated in 
this paper could be the result of antenatal corticosteroids and 
immediate cord clamping.  
David Hutchon (DJRHutchon@Postmaster.co.uk)
Ben Ononeze
Darlington Memorial Hospital
Darlington, County Durham, United Kingdom
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Novel Therapies for Tuberculosis: 
Tuberculosis Control and its 
Discontents
Jose Luis Portero, Maria Rubio
Salomon JA et al. [1] show through mathematical models 
the hypothetical high impact on tuberculosis (TB) control 
of a new shorter treatment regimen in South-East Asia. The 
model assumes all the positive determinants to enhance TB 
control but none of the negative ones, so the model is a kind 
of tautology that drives to an inevitable success.
Defaulting, relapsing, and drug resistance do not have to 
be major problems when a TB control programme based on 
DOTS [directly observed treatment, short-course] strategy 
is well established with the current six months treatment 
[2]. These factors are usually cited as the main obstacles to 
control TB, the patients being the guilty party, but the reality 
is more complex: failed health systems, inequity, and poverty 
hamper the right to use TB services.
It is arguable that shorter regimens and new technology 
increase case detection by themselves. Their effect is all the 
greater in an environment of health inequality and scarcity, 
as in the high TB burden countries. It is not clear if new 
drugs and technology will be cheaper, fully feasible, and more 
effective than the current ones on the ﬁ  eld. 
Strengthening of operative health research could be the 
fastest way in the short term to ﬁ  nd local solutions to use 
meagre ﬁ  nancial resources [3]. Migration of local health 
workers looking for better living conditions could be critical 
for the TB programmes in the future [4]. It is likely that new 
tools and treatments need equal or more qualiﬁ  ed human 
resources than are needed today. Lack of qualiﬁ  ed health 
personnel, fast rotations in their posts, and reductions of 
personnel due to health sector reform policies shrink the cost 
effectiveness of training human resources on TB control and 
paradoxically could increase the necessity of more personnel 
for the same outcome.
On the other hand, World Health Organization indicators 
to evaluate TB control may not be the most appropriate 
to measure the reality [5]. A critical revision of current 
measuring tools will shed light on the success and pitfalls 
of TB control [6]. Changes in the fashion of global disease 
control priorities, rise of expenses as programmes develop, 
and donor fatigue should be contemplated in the long term 
[7].
The barriers to access TB services are caused mainly by 
poverty and its complex socioeconomic determinants, but 
this key variable is hard to represent into the mathematical 
models [8]. Could TB be controlled through technology 
despite a world of increasing poverty?  
Jose Luis Portero (jporteronavio@yahoo.com)
Maria Rubio
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